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CASE COMMENTS
section io(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act gave it an indepen-
dent basis for standing,57 although the ultimate result of the decision
was the same as though the court had accepted ICI's contention. Never-
theless, standing was granted in order to reach what the court felt
were the important questions raised by the merits of the case.
Though the court does not reveal any particular rationale behind
the grant of standing, -the presence of several elements seemed to have
substantially influenced the court in making its decision. Both con-
curring judges stressed the fact that ICI was factually aggrieved by the
action of the Comptroller.58 In addition, a matter of public interest
was involved 9 and ICI was probably the only party, practically speak-
ing, who would raise the issue before a court.6 0 The cumulative effect
of these factors makes a persuasive case for standing.
Presented with such a strong case, the court adopted an elastic ap-
proach to the question of standing. This approach does not seem to
have been stretched to its outer limit, however, for it does not appear
that the court went so far as to adopt a theory of discretionary stand-
ing. Nevertheless, it may fairly be said that National Association of
Securities Dealers did extend the private attorney general doctrine by
no longer requiring that an aggrieved party statute be present in order
to confer standing.
LARRY W. WERTZ
INDEMNITY ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE LIABILITY PROVISION OF
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT.
When a government employee is injured while in the course of his
employment and the injury is due, at least in part, to the negligence
of a third person, the employee has two alternatives in seeking satisfac-
,tion for his injuries. He may recover limited compensation under the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act' or he may sue the negligent
the Glass-Steagall Act contained no aggrieved party provision. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, No. 2o,164 at 32 (D.C. Cir., July 1, 1969).
nNational Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, No. 20,164 at 34, 40 (D.C. Cir.,
July 1, 1969).
'9Text accompanying note 14 supra.
rText accompanying note 15 supra.
¢Text accompanying note i6 supra.
TFederal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 81o2 (Supp. IV, 1968) [here-
inafter referred to as FECA].
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third party for damages in tort.2 In the event that the employee chooses
the latter alternative and a settlement is reached, the third party may
then attempt to bring an action against the United States for indem-
nity or contribution by alleging that the Government was either pri-
marily or partially to blame for the injury.3
The United States may then invoke the exclusive liability section
of FECA,4 contending that this provision bars any action against the
Government arising out of an injury to one of its employees. 5 This
argument, however, has not always been accepted by the federal
courts.6 Thus, the question as to whether the United States may in
fact be sued in this situation, and if so, under what circumstances re-
covery may be allowed, enjoys a current vitality.
A recent case illustrative of this problem is Bremen v. United
States.7 In Bremen a United States agricultural inspector was injured
in a fall from a gangway while debarking the M/V Martha after an
inspection of the ship's food stores. The inspector brought suit against
Bremen, the shipowner, seeking damages for his injuries allegedly re-
sulting from Bremen's negligence. Bremen settled for $1o,ooo and
then brought action against the United States for indemnity on the
theory that the United States knew or should have known that the
inspector was physically unfit to perform his duties safely and that
these infirmities caused or contributed to his fall.8 The lower court, in
21d. §§ 8131, 8132. As a third alternative, the injured employee could pursue
both avenues of recovery. In such a case, however, section 8131 provides that the
United States may require the employee either to assign his right of action against
the third party to the United States or to prosecute the action in his own name.
If the employee sues the third party and recovers money or property in satisfaction
of that liability, section 8132 provides that as a result of this suit or settlement,
and after deducting the reasonable expenses of the suit, he must refund the amount
of compensation paid by the United States and credit any surplus toward any future
payments under FECA for that particular injury.
3
See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 48 (3d ed. 1964).
'Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (Supp. IV, 1968),
formerly ch. 691, § 2ox, 63 Stat. 861 (1949).
5Christie v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C. 1954).
°See, e.g., Weyehaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963).
4o9 F.2d 994 (4 th Cir. 1969), 'petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S.
Aug. 26, 1969) (No. 498).
8Bremen v. United States, 409 F.2d 994 (4 th Cir. 1969).
Such allegations, fleshed out in the complaint, presented a three-pronged
theory of recovery. Conceivably Bremen might be entitled to recover on
either (3) a strict tort indemnity theory, or because of (2) implied war-
ranty or contract of indemnity said to arise from the conduct of the
United States in requiring the ship to submit to agricultural inspection.
It was also contended that Bremen was entitled to recover on (3) an
independent tort theory based upon an alleged breach of a duty of




granting the Government's motion for summary judgment, held that
since the United States could not be sued by the injured employee
under FECA, it was protected from an indemnity action by the third
party defendant.9 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held, in effect,
that indemnity actions against the Government are not barred per se
under FECA.10 In remanding the case for a determination of whether
or not Bremen might be entitled to recover under any of the claims
originally advanced,'" the court rejected the theory of indemnity relied
on by the lower court, i.e., that there must be a common liability be-
tween the indemnitor and indemnitee to the injured party for indem-
nity to be allowed.'
2
In reaching its decision, the circuit court looked to the exclusive
liability section of FECA as it was originally enacted. The Act provided
in part:
The liability of the United States ... with respect to the injury
or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all other
liability of the United States... to the employee, his legal rep-
resentative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and anyone other-
wise entitled to recover damages from the United States ... be-
cause of the injury or death.., in a civil action, or in admiral-
ity... or under a Federal tort liability statute.'3
"Bremen v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Va. 1968).
10Bremen v. United States, 409 F.2d 994, 997 (4th Cir. 1969).
"In addition to the non-contractual tort indemnity theory advanced in the
district court, the lower court on remand was instructed to consider whether
recovery might also be allowed on a contractual theory of indemnity. Id. at
998-99.
2Id. at 998. In rejecting the theory of common liability as a necessity to sup-
port an action for idemnity, the court advanced its own theory. It said: "As for
the law of indemnity we think the better rule is that which rests the right of
indemnity upon violation of a duty of care to the injured person rather than
upon tort 'liability'." Id. It appears that the court was wavering a bit here for
it referred to the duty owed to the injured person rather than a separate duty
owed by the employer to the third party, which was one of the theories the
shipowner had advanced.
"Federal Employees' Compensation Act, ch. 691, § 201, 63 Stat. 861 (1949)
(emphasis added). The wording "anyone otherwise entitled" was used when the
exclusive liability provision was originally enacted in 1949. Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, ch. 691, § 2oi, 63 Stat. 861 (1949), as amended 5 U.S.C. §
8116(c) (Supp. IV, 1968). In i966, however, the wording "any other person other-
wise entitled" was used in place of "anyone otherwise entitled." Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (Supp. IV, 1968), formerly ch. 691, § 201,
63 Stat. 861 (1949).
A survey of the legislative history neither reveals any intent for nor any
suggested reason behind this change. See S. Ra. No. 1285. 8 9 th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966). Although it seems as if the language in the 1966 version is broader, this
change in language has never been cited in support of the proposition that all
possible actions arising out of an injury to a government employee are barred.
1970]
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Using the theory of ejusdem generis,14 the court reasoned that the
phrase "anyone otherwise entitled" relates back and is limited to those
who may derive their claims from a "personal relationship" with the
employee. 15 The rationale behind this was that such claimants have al-
ready been compensated by the statutory remedy and should be barred
from further recovery against the Government. 16 Persons not standing
in such a relationship to the injured employee, however, are afforded
no such relief. Thus, the court concluded that FECA did not, ipso
facto, bar indemnity actions by a third party defendant against the
Government.' 7
This conclusion was further supported by the court's analysis of
the legislative history of the exclusive liability provision of FECA.
The court reasoned that since there was no mention of the rights of
third parties against the United States, Congress did not intend to bar
such actions by the statute.' 8 Rather the real purpose of the Act was
"'This theory has been defined as follows:
In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the 'ejusdem
generis rule' is, that where general words follow an enumeration of per-
sons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class
as those specifically mentioned. [citations omitted] The rule, however,
does not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in its
scope to the identical things specifically named. Nor does it apply when
the context manifests a contrary intention.
BLAcC'S LAw DIc'IONAPLY 608 (4 th ed. rev. 1968).
154o9 F.2d at 995. The court further explained:
The catch-all category simply expresses congressional caution, typical in
the drafting of statutes, to exclude all deriving their claims from a personal
relationship to the government employee. Ejusdem generis would, for
example, perhaps exclude from any other remedy an adopted child,
neither next of kin nor dependent, but would not exclude a stranger.
id.
'Old. Contra, Rhoades v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
In Rhoades, two government employees were killed when a United Air Lines
plane, in which they were riding, collided with a military aircraft. The decedents'
heirs settled their claims with United Air Lines, who in turn tried to sue the
government for indemnity or contribution. When the government argued that
the exclusive liability section of FECA barred such suit, United Air Lines invoked
the ejusdem generis theory, claiming that only the class of persons mentioned in
the statute were barred from suit. In rejecting this argument, the court stated
that the word "otherwise" in the phrase "anyone otherwise entitled" indicated
that the statute included anyone who might be able to recover from the United
States because of the injury or death to the employee, including those unlike
the previous types mentioned. Id. at 733.
274o9 F.2d at 998.
28Id. at 996. See S. REp. No. 836, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 28 (1949). The report
provided in part:
The purpose of the latter [exclusive liability section] is to make it
[Vol. XXVII
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to limit any recovery from the United States by an injured employee
solely to that compensation which FECA provides.' 9
A survey of the two lines of cases that have been concerned with the
question of whether recovery-over 2o should be allowed under the ex-
clusive remedy provision of FECA reveals that courts have, more often
than not, been disposed to deny contribution and indemnity.2 ' On the
one hand, the courts that have protected the Government from such
actions generally have used two different approaches. Some courts have
strictly construed the statute and have held that the phrases "anyone
clear that the right to compensation benefits under the act is exclusive
and in place of any and all other legal liability of the United States...
Thus, an important gap in the present law would be filled and at the
same time needless and expensive litigation will be replaced with measured
justice. The savings to the United States, both in damages recovered and
the expense of handling the lawsuits, should be very substantial and
the employees will benefit accordingly ....
Id.
"4o9 F.2d at 996. Accord, Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
597 (1963). Addressing itself to this point the Supreme Court said:
The purpose of § 7(b), added in 1949, was to establish that, as between
the Government on the one hand and its employees and their repre-
sentatives or dependents on the other, the statutory remedy was to be
exclusive. There is no evidence whatever that Congress was concerned
with the rights of unrelated third parties ....
Id. at 6oi. But see Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1964). In
Busey the court reasoned that if a third party were allowed to recover contribu-
tion or indemnity from the United States, it would violate the expressed con-
gressional purpose of limiting the Government's damages and place an additional
burden on the treasury. Furthermore, since FECA is the Government's form of
workmen's compensation, to allow recovery here would violate an underlying
principle of placing a limited and determinate liability on the employer. Id. at
422-23.
w"Recover-over" is a term used when referring to both indemnity and contribu-
tion. Generally it signifies that act of a third party recovering money from a
primary or secondary wrongdoer in the amount the third party has had to pay
by virtue of a suit by the injured party against the third party. See 2 A. LARSON,
THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
21The cases can be generally classified in two categories: (i) Those where
recovery has been allowed as between a -third party defendant and the United
States for an injury to a government employee: Treadwell Const. Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 772 (1963), vacating per curiam sub. nom. Drake v. Treadwell
Constr. Co., 299 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1962); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States,
372 US. 597 (1963); Hart v. Simons, 223 F. Supp. io9 (E.D. Pa. 1963); and (2)
those where recovery has not been allowed: Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d
1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d x19 (8th Cir. 1967); Wien Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940
(1967); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
379 U.S. 951 (1964); Scarbrough v. Murrow Transfer Co., 277 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.
Tenn. 1967); Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1964); Drumgoole
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 170 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va. 1959); Christie v. Powder
Power Tool Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C. 1954)-
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otherwise entitled" and "under a Federal tort liability statute" pre-
clude any action against the United States arising out of an injury to
a government employee.22 Most of the courts which have denied con-
tribution or indemnity, however, follow the rationale of United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Wiener23 where the court by-passed the strict construc-
tion argument in reaching the same result by invoking the theory that
contribution and indemnity actions necessitate a common liability be-
tween the Government and the third party. While the third party is
liable in tort, the Government is only liable for limited compensation
under the provisions of FECA, and since the parties do not stand in
the same relationship of liability, there is no basis for recovery.24
On the other hand, the leading case allowing recovery to a third
person under FECA is Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States.25
There, the Supreme Court allowed contribution and held that the
admiralty rule26 governing the correlative rights and duties of two
vessels involved in a mutual fault collision took precedence over the
exclusive remedy section of the Act. Although other courts have fol-
'See, e.g., Christie v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C.
1954). In Christie, where a third party defendant brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1964), seeking indemnity or con-
tribution for damages it had paid to an injured civilian employee of the United
States, it was held that the only recovery allowed against the Government for
injuries to its employees is compensation under FECA. Any other recovery against
the United States is automatically precluded by the terms and wording of the
exclusive liability provision of FECA. Id at 694.
035 F.2d 379 (9 th Cir. 1964). In Wiener, two government employees were
killed in a mid-air plane collision between a commercial airliner and an Air Force
jet. The lower court found both planes were partially at fault. Wiener v. United
Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 7o, 705 (S.D. Cal. 1962). When the airline company sought
indemnity from the United States for the damages it had paid to the decendents'
-heirs, the court denied the action. Although it was conceded that such indemnity
actions were not expressly barred by the exclusive liability section of FECA, it
was concluded that since there was no underlying tort liability of the Government
to its employees, there was no basis for indemnification to a third party. United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 402 (9 th Cir. 1964).
"The cases where the courts have relied in the theory of common liability to
the injured party as necessary to sustain an action by the third party to recover-
over from Government under FECA have been: Murray v. United States, 405
F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (contribution); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1967) (contribution); Wien Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d
736 (gth Cir. 1967) (indemnity); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379
(gth Cir. 1964) (based on indemnity, but contribution was also said to apply);
Scarbrough v. Murrow Transfer Co., 277 F. Supp. 92 (Ef.. Tenn. 1967) (contribu-
tion and indemnity); Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1964) (con-
tribution); Drumgoole v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 17o F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va.
1959) (contribution and indemnity).
m372 U.S. 597 (1963).
"The "North Star," io6 U.S. 17 (1882).
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lowed the Weyerhaeuser reasoning in allowing contribution,27 no
court has specifically allowed indemnity under FECA. It is evident,
however, that in a proper case of implied contract,28 or where an in-
dependent duty29 between the third party and the Government is
found, indemnity could be allowed.
This possibility was indicated in the recent case of Murray v.
United States.30 In Murray, a government employee was injured in a
falling elevator and sued the building owner for negligence. The em-
ployee was awarded compensation under FECA and also recovered
damages from the owner in tort. The owner then sought contribution
from the United States alleging that the Government was a joint tort-
feasor. Although the court denied contribution on the ground that
there was no joint liability of the parties to the injured employee, 31 it
recognized that "if the case fairly presented a claim for non-contract
indemnity we would be confronted with a difficult question." 32 The
difficulty of the question apparently stems from the fact that there have
been two conflicting views on whether the common liability theory
"Less than a month after Weyerhaeuser was decided, the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the lower court in Drake v. Treadwell Construction Co.,
which had denied contribution to a third party who had paid damages to an
injured government employee. 299 F.2d 789 (3 d Cir. 1962). In a per curiam opinion,
the case was remanded to be considered "in light of Weyerhaeuser." Treadwell
Constr. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 772 (1963). On remand, contribution was al-
lowed and the Government did not appeal. See Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d
1361, 1364-65 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See Brief for Appellant at 8, Bremen v. United
States, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969).
In the next year, another case arose in Pennsylvania where a NASA employee
was injured by an electric shock from an allegedly faulty machine manufactured
by the third party. Relying on Weyerhaeuser and Treadwell, the district court
allowed the third party to maintain an action for contribution. Hart v. Simons,
223 F. Supp. 1o9 (E.D. Pa. 1963). It is interesting to note, however, that the
ultimate settlement provided that the third party claim for contribution should
be dismissed. See Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1365 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
2sSince the federal district courts have original jurisdiction for contract claims
against the United States "not exceeding $io,ooo," a third party's claim for indemnity
based on a theory of express or implied contract in those courts would have to
limited to that amount. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1964). It appears that
if the third party is going to use the contract theory for indemnity, he must
intend to limit his claim to $io,ooo or less, or else his claim on this theory will
be dismissed in the district court. Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1366
(D.C. Cir. 1968). In Bremen, although express and implied contract were two of
the theories on which the shipowner claimed recovery, there is no indication that
the shipowner intended to limit his claim against the Government. 4o9 F.2d at
995. Therefore his recovery on a contract theory will probably fail.
2$See Murray v. United States, 4o5 F.2d 1361, 1366-68 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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should be applied only to contribution cases, or extended to indemnity
as in Wiener.3
Courts have often confused the distinction between contribution
and indemnity,34 and when dealing with the right to recover under
workmen's compensation statutes, this has been a particular problem.35
Those tribunals which have construed the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,3 6 whose basic principles are very similar
to those of FECA,37 have established a general rule that where an em-
ployer is not liable to an employee under the Act, the employer cannot
be sued for contribution. 38 The reason is that since he is not liable to
the employee in tort, he cannot be a joint tortfeasor. Where, however,
it may be found that the employer has breached some duty to the third
party and thereby caused a payment of damages to an injured em-
ployee, the courts have used this independent duty as a point of depar-
ture from the common liability theory, and have allowed indemnity
where such breach of duty has primarily caused the injury.3 9 Although
"Id. In Murray the court saw a problem in reconciling Wiener which had
applied the common liability theory to cases of non-contractual indemnity with
the cases that have arisen under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901, 905 (1964), that have allowed indemnity on the
basis of an independent duty. Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1365 ().C.
Cir. 1968). Compare United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964),
with Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1951).
"W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 48 (3 d ed. 1964).
52 LARSON § 76.10 (1968). See also, Sykes, Contribution and Indemnity: The
Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REv. 959 (1956).
"_Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50
(1964). The Act provides in part:
The liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, hus-
band or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise en-
titled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
account of such injury or death....
Id. § 9o5.
"Compare, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 9o, 905 (1964) with Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8102,
8n16(c) (Supp. IV, 1968). The Supreme Court recognized the similarity between
this section and the exclusive liability section of FECA when it termed the two
provisions as "nearly identical." Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. United States. 372 U.S.
597, 602 (1963).
"2 LARSON § 76.21 (1968); accord, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d
784 (3 d Cir. 1953); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthew, 182 F.2d 322 (2d
Cir. 1950); Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1951).
"Some courts have allowed indemnity on the basis of a duty found in an
implied contract. Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964);
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 597 (1956); see Crawford
v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3 d Cir. 1953). But see note 28 supra.
Other courts have allowed indemnity on the basis of an independent duty
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no court has held that these rules should be applied in cases arising
under FECA, both the construction given to the Longshoremen's Act
40
and the reasoning as expressed in Murray4' would seem to dictate that
result.
Recognizing that FECA is the Government's form of workmen's
compensation,42 an important consideration in applying the above
rules to the Act is whether or not such an application may in fact vio-
late an underlying principle of limiting the liability of the employer.4 3
By allowing the third party to recover indemnity, the Government-
employer is indirectly liable for a greater amount than is contemplated
under the Act.4 4 Not only is a greater burden forced upon the public
owed by the employer to the third party. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811
(D.C. Cir. 1950) (where when the wife of an injured employee sued his employer
for loss of consortium, the court allowed recovery based upon the breach of an
independent duty owed to her by the employer); Rich v. United States, 177 F.2d
688 (2d Cir. 1949) (an action for indemnity was allowed where it was alleged that
the employer was negligent in fastening a ladder insecurely for the employee's
use causing him to fall into a cleaning tank); see Burris v. American Chicle Co.,
12o F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941) (indemnity was allowed as between a building owner
and an employer-contractor whose failure to comply with a New York statute
prescribing certain equipment to be used in scaffolding caused an employee to
fall while cleaning the building's windows); Green v. War Shipping Adm'n., 66
F. Supp. 393 (E.D. N.Y. 1946) (when an employee who was injured while repair-
ing a vessel sued the owner of the vessel, the court allowed the employer to be
impleaded for any damages the owner had to pay on account of the employer's
negligence).
Some courts, although not deciding the point directly, have also indicated
that in the proper setting an indemnity action may be maintained on the basis
of an independent duty. See Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951)
(where the court denied indemnity because there was no contract or other "legal
relationship" between the parties); Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp.
779 (D.D.C. 1951) (where the court, in dictum, said that if the third party had
claimed indemnity on the theory that the employer was the primary wrongdoer, the
complaint would have been for the breach of an independent duty, and the em-
ployer would not be protected by the exclusive remedy provision of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
Contra Drumgoole v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 17o F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va.
1959). In Drumgoole, the third party claimed contribution or indemnity should be
allowed on the basis of an independent tort liability. The court dismissed this
argument as "not wholly sound" and denied recovery since "neither contribution
nor indemnity may succeed without the support of the initial negligence." Id. at
825.
'0Another statute that has similar wording in its exclusive liability section as
FECA is N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMp. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965). The leading case
decided under an independent duty theory was Westchester Lighting Co. v.
Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
41405 F.2d at 1366-68.
'2S. REP. No. 836, 8ist Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1949).
lBusey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416, 423 (D.D.C. 1964).
"Cf. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956)
(dissenting opinion).
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treasury in contravention of congressional sanction, 45 but there is
also a refutation of the quid pro quo idea whereby the Government
makes itself absolutely liable for limited compensation as a substitute
for an employee's excluded claims.4 6 When considered from the point-
of-view of the third party, however, it seems that there is more justifi-
cation for allowing indemnity. He has received no such quid pro quo
from the Government.4 7 Furthermore, since workmen's compensation
is strictly a relationship between the employer and employee, it should
have no effect on the rights of third parties against the employer, es-
pecially when those rights are based on a separate duty.
4 8
In addition to balancing the arguments from the standpoint of the
principles of workmen's compensation, it must also be recognized that
if the indemnity action is not allowed to be heard on the merits, the
Government not only may avoid any liability to the third party, but
also may recover from the employee any compensation paid under the
Act.4 9 Thus, the United States may be relieved of all liability simply
because there has been a third party tortfeasor. When it is further con-
sidered that the Government may well be a primary wrongdoer, it be-
comes increasingly apparent that any summary dismissal of an in-
demnity action under these circumstances may lead to a result which
offends any sense of fairness and justice.
The rejection of the Wiener theory of common liability as applied
to indemnity in Bremen is a divergence from the general trend of the
cases decided under FECA. Thus, the issue is squarely before the
courts, and if they choose to follow Bremen, indemnity actions will no
'1Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416, 422 (D.D.C. 1964).
"Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U-S. 124, 129 (1956).
'7See Burnside Shipping Co. v. Federal Marine Terminals, 284 F. Supp. 740,
749 (ND. Ill. 1967).
"Sykes, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation
Acts, 42 VA. L. Ray. 959 (1956) and 2 Larson §§ 76.51-53 (1968) provide full dis-
cussions of the rights of third parties against employers under workmen's compensa-
tion laws.
"See note 2 supra. Compare, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964) with Federal Employees' Compensation Act, §§
8131, 8132 (Supp. IV, 1968). See also Federal Marine Terminal. Inc. v. Burnside
Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969). In this case a stevedoring contractor paid com-
pensation benefits pursuant to the Longshoremen's Act to the administratrix of
one of its employees who was killed while working aboard the defendant's ship. In
allowing indemnity for these payments in a direct action in tort against the de-
fendant shipowner, the court held that the shipowner owed a duty of care to the
stevedoring company. Since the breach of this duty gave rise to the employee's
recovery against the stevedoring company, the company was allowed recovery
from the shipowner. Id. Although this is the converse of the situation in Bremen,
there is no apparent reason why a breach of duty owed by the employer to the
shipowner would not give rise to a like recovery.
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